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Transmission biases in the cultural evolution of language: 
towards an explanatory framework 




In any natural, causal account of linguistic and other cultural 
transmission, an important role is played by the biases that 
regulate the process at various levels. These biases ultimately 
regulate the historical, cumulative transmission of culture. One 
reason for wanting to understand these biases is that they are 
phenomena of interest in themselves. In addition, while the 
discussion here presupposes the prior evolution of a capacity 
for cumulative culture in our species, our interest in 
transmission biases should ideally also give us some insight 
into that initial phylogenetic transition. In this chapter I discuss 
some of the biases that have been described in previous work 
relating to cultural change, including the historical evolution of 
language, and I will point to the need for a framework within 
which to explain just why we observe the biases we observe. 
After sketching a proposal for such an explanatory framework, 
I conclude by pointing toward some lines of research that this 
opens up. 
 
31.2 Cultural epidemiology 
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In the cultural evolution of language, that is, the diffusion, 
maintenance, and change of linguistic practices in historical 
communities, it is often assumed or implied that the unit of 
analysis is the language system as a whole. But the replication 
and transmission of whole language systems is not causally 
conducted at the system level. It is an aggregate outcome of a 
massive set of much simpler and much smaller concrete speech 
events that operate on the elements which form part of any 
language, such as a word or a piece of grammar (Hudson 
1996). Language systems only exist because populations of 
linguistic items replicate and circulate in human communities, 
where these items are directly observable as elements of spoken 
utterances (Croft 2000; Enfield 2003; Enfield 2008). A causal 
account of language evolution focusing on the transmission of 
linguistic items can be termed an epidemiological view of 
language change, following Sperber (1985; 1996), and in a 
similar spirit to Keller (1994) and Croft (2000). In an item-
based account, the pieces of a language or other cultural system 
can change independently from other pieces, and they can be 
plucked out and borrowed from one system to another, as for 
example when we borrow a word. Of course, the notion of 
‘item’ is an abstraction. An item in the sense intended here 
does not refer to a bounded physical object. Even when such 
objects are implied (e.g., a cultural tool like a hammer), the 
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item is always defined by sets of relations. Thus, a hammer is 
only a cultural item when we include not just the object but its 
relation to the human body, and the functions it is designed for 
fulfilling (e.g., banging in nails). So, even the simplest items 
must be understood to be packages of relations. And of course 
all packages of relations are embedded in further such 
packages, and again in further such packages, and so on 
seemingly without limit, as any ethnographer or grammarian 
well knows. This is why an item-based account must also 
ultimately be able to handle the special properties of higher-
level linguistic systems or grammars. But we must avoid a 
temptation to treat these robustly coherent systems as if they 
were organisms with bodies. Cultural systems are not 
organisms. They are observed aggregates of behaviour, 
distributed in patterns of cognition, action, and material 
structure in the form of cultural items and the interrelations 
between those items. While ultimately we need a causal 
account for why it sometimes seems like we can treat 
languages as if they were organism-like systems (e.g., when we 
write grammars), it is first necessary to define the basic 
underlying causal anatomy of item-based language 
transmission. Here I outline the basics of a ‘transmission 
biases’ approach to the historical evolution of languages.  
 
31.3 Biased transmission 
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The diffusion of cultural items is best understood in terms of a 
biased transmission model of the distribution of cultural 
knowledge and practice within human populations and across 
generations, following a general framework of cultural 
epidemiology (Sperber 1985; Sperber 1996; Boyd and 
Richerson 1985; Boyd and Richerson 2005; Enfield 2003; 
Enfield 2008). In a biased transmission model, the question of 
whether fashions of cultural practice in a population spread, 
decline, transform, or remain as they are will be determined the 
cumulative effect of a range of biases which ultimately serve as 
accelerants or decelerants on cultural practices in a competition 
for social uptake.  
 
Linguistic and other cultural items are not confined to 
the mind, or to perceptible performance, but are simultaneously 
manifest in mental and material domains, and in relations 
between these domains. At any given moment, a human 
population is abuzz with a virtual mesh of ongoing causal 
chains that constitute continuous trajectories of production and 
comprehension of item-level patterns of behaviour. I am 
referring to all of the situated courses of behaviour in which 
people carry out goal-directed action by means of words, tools, 
body movements, and other cultural items. These trajectories of 
behaviour are the contexts in which the natural histories of 
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cultural and linguistic items are played out. They constitute 
causal chains with links from mind (I know a word, I 
understand a tool) to usage (I utter the word in a 
communicative act, I use the tool for a purpose), to mind (my 
addressee learns or recognizes the word, an onlooker builds or 
confirms an understanding of the tool’s function, attributing a 
goal to my behaviour), to usage, to mind, to usage, to mind, to 
usage, and on. We may call this type of causal trajectory a 
chain of iterated practice, or a cognitive causal chain (Sperber 
2006). See Fig. 31.1 for a simplified illustration. 
 
FIG. 31.1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Fig. 31.1 is not the same as the ‘iterated learning’ chains 
presented by Kirby and colleagues (2004; 2008), Christiansen 
and Chater (2008), among others (see below). Those iterated 
learning depictions resemble Fig. 31.1, but they are not the 
same. In iterated learning, each arrow from public to private 
may represent an entire learning process such as a child’s 
learning of a language. Each link in the chain is effectively a 
single macro-level ‘state change’ in ontogeny (e.g., the move 
from not knowing the language to knowing the language). This 
is shorthand for a great number of small events and small 
associated state changes. Learning a language involves not one 
event but many iterations of exposure and reproduction, and in 
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each occasion of exposure and reproduction there is feedback 
that comes from others’ reactions to our usage of words for 
communicative goals in context. This feedback plays an 
essential role in learning. The iterated learning model abstracts 
away from these details (not without practical reason), while 
the iterated practice model in Fig. 31.1 attempts to capture 
them directly and explicitly. While iterated learning focuses on 
the ontogenetic or biographical timescale, iterated practice 
focuses on the enchronic timescale, that is, the timescale of 
moves and counter-moves in sequences of human interaction 
(Enfield 2009:10; Enfield 2011:285-291, 2013 Ch. 4). In Fig. 
31.1, each link in the chain from private-public-private does not 
represent a generation of individuals in a human population (by 
contrast with the comparable figure in Christiansen and Chater 
2008). It represents a generation of individuals in a population 
of items, that is, one local cycle of instantiation of a practice, 
such as a single use of a word, a single performance of a ritual, 
or a single occasion of making bacon and eggs for breakfast.  
 
The schema in Fig. 31.1 draws our attention to a set of 
little bridges that a bit of culture has to cross if it is to survive a 
cycled of iterated practice. What are the forces that facilitate 
the passage across those bridges, and what are the forces that 
inhibit it? These forces are called transmission biases 
(following Boyd and Richerson (1985; 2005). This kind of 
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account assumes a standard model of Darwinian evolution 
(variation of heritable characters in a population), but where the 
variation is ‘guided’ in a specific way. As Boyd and Richerson 
(1985) formulate it, variation of cultural items is guided by the 
properties of human agents. If, for example, a certain way of 
doing something is easier to learn than some other functionally 
equivalent way (e.g., doing maths on an abacus versus a 
calculator), then this greater ease is likely to increase the 
frequency of the easier variant in the population, and, all things 
being equal, this variant will also in turn increase in frequency 
simply because it is already higher in frequency. Christiansen 
and Chater (2008) use this idea in arguing that the properties of 
the human brain, e.g., for language learning and processing, 
favour certain linguistic variants over others, leading to the 
view that language is the way it is because it is ‘shaped by the 
brain’, and thus not because the evolution of a language faculty 
has caused the human brain to change in some fundamental 
way because of how language is.  
 
Assuming this model of guided variation, the question 
then becomes: What are the forces that serve to guide variation 
in this way, and that operate upon different variants within a 
population, ultimately determining whether they become, or 
remain, conventional in a population? We now consider some 
of the known biases. 
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31.4 Some previously described transmission biases 
 
Variants of cultural behaviour compete for adoption by 
individuals in human populations. Different researchers have 
described different biases, sometimes in quite specific terms, 
sometimes in broader terms. For example, Chater and 
Christiansen (2009) describe four factors that mostly have to do 
with properties of the individual human body, especially the 
brain: (1) perceptuo-motor factors, (2) cognitive limitations on 
learning and processing, (3) constraints from mental 
representations, (4) pragmatic constraints. These factors can 
affect the likelihood that one linguistic variant is selected over 
another, though the social mechanisms that are also a necessary 
part of the process are left implicit by these authors. By 
contrast, Boyd and Richerson (1985) introduce distinctions that 
are broader in kind. They illustrate with an example from table 
tennis. For the function of hitting the ball, one may choose 
between holding the bat with a pencil grip or a handle grip. 
Choosing one of these variants necessary precludes choosing 
the other. They discuss different biases that might cause a 
person to select one grip over the other. A direct bias concerns 
the relationship between the variant and the adopter, and thus it 
concerns affordances (Gibson 1979). An individual should 
choose variant A if it is somehow more advantageous than 
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variant B for a proximate function in a given context. Thus, by 
a direct bias we should choose the grip that is easier, more 
effective, feels better, gives better results. An indirect bias 
works with reference to a notion of social identity, assuming 
that the variant a person selects will be seen by others and that 
this will lend a certain status to both the adopter (as the kind of 
person who adopts that variant) and the variant (as a variant 
that is adopted by that person or someone like that). We adopt 
variants of behaviours not only for their proximate efficacy but 
also with some notion of how we will be seen by others when 
we make that choice. So by an indirect bias we should choose 
the same grip as people who we identify with, or want to 
emulate. Finally, a frequency-dependent bias favours variants 
that are more frequent.  
 
Similar biases have been described in a vast literature in 
sociology on the diffusion of innovations (Rogers 1995). Here, 
we can discern three sets of conditioning or causal factors in 
the success or failure of a practice. First, sociometric factors 
concern the network structure of demographic groups. 
Different individuals are differently socially connected, 
especially in terms of the number of their points of connection 
to others in a social network, as well as the quality (e.g., 
intensity) of these connections. A practice is more likely to 
spread if it is being modelled by someone who is widely 
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connected in a network, simply because he or she will expose a 
greater number of people to the practice. Gladwell (2000) 
refers to this as the law of the few.  Second, personality factors 
concern differences between individuals in the population that 
can have consequences for the success or failure of an 
innovation. Some people are more willing than others to 
innovate and to adopt others’ innovations (early adopters 
versus laggards). And these differences may correlate with 
social categories such as age, class, and sub-culture. Some 
people are better known or better admired in their social milieu 
and may thus be more likely to be imitated. Third, there is the 
sheer utility of an innovation, more or less what Boyd and 
Richerson (1985) mean by direct bias, outlined above. The 
innovation will take off if it is more advantageous to potential 
adopters.  
 
The biases that we have just reviewed might be seen as 
a somewhat unstructured, ad hoc list. It is clear that they each 
play an important role in the mechanisms of transmission that 
drive the circulation of bits of culture in human populations. 
But how to explain them? Where do these biases come from 
and how are they related to each other? How can we limit this 
possibility space? Can we motivate these biases by locating 
them directly in the causal anatomy of transmission? What 
predictions are possible?  
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One way to motivate and constrain the possibility space 
of transmission biases is to develop an explanatory framework 
that is grounded in the basic structure of iterated practice 
shown in Fig. 31.1. Let us now see how this structure gives us a 
way of locating and characterizing the biases. If we examine 
the elements of transmission illustrated in Fig. 31.1, we see at 
the heart of it a repeating, four-stroke cycle of transmission 
consisting of the following steps: 
 
(1) Exposure, a process of going from public to private, made 
possible by a mind and body coming into contact with, 
and perceiving/engaging with, the public instantiation 
of a bit of culture; 
 
(2) Representation, the storing and organizing of a private 
construct based on (1), and the private product of this 
process; 
 
(3) Reproduction, a process of going from private to public, 
made possible in part by an individual’s motivation to 
cause the same public event as in (1).  
 
(4) Material, the material instantiation of the result of an event 
of reproduction of a cultural item. 
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(5) Stages (3-4) can then lead to another round by exposing 
another person to the cultural item in question (feeding 
into a new stage (1)).  
 
FIG. 31.2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Each of the four steps is a bridge or existential threshold 
for any bit of culture to succeed or fail in the competition for 
uptake in a human population. If people aren’t exposed to it, it 
will die. If it is difficult to represent mentally, or if in the 
course of mental representation it is radically altered, it will 
die, or effectively die. If people aren’t motivated to reproduce 
it, no further exposure will happen, and with the biological 
death of those individuals with mental representations of the 
practice in question will come the historical death of the 
practice, as happens for example with language extinction. And 
if the material realization of the practice is not available to the 
perception of others, the transmission process will stall. Failure 
on any of these four links causes a break in the chain and may 
cause the variant to no longer exist.  
 
It is important not to get the impression that a single 
such chain represents the entire historical trajectory of a 
cultural item. It is only the tiniest strand. This is because at any 
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moment, there is a veritable thicket of equivalent chains of 
iterated practice that keep a practice alive and evolving in the 
kind of sizable human population that would constitute a 
historical cultural community.  
 
As discussed above, the key question that a biased 
transmission approach to linguistic epidemiology seeks to 
answer is: What are the filters, pumps, and transformers in an 
item’s career? On the present proposal, we can posit four 
functionally-defined groups of biases. Each group of biases is 
defined by the function it serves in accelerating, braking, or 
transforming the transmission of practices in human 
populations through social-cultural interaction (i.e., at an 
enchronic level). While there may be a long, if not open list of 
possible biases, each should fall into one of the four categories, 
exhaustively defined by the basic causal structure represented 
in Fig. 31.1 and 31.2 above: exposure biases (relating to the 
world-to-mind transition), representation biases (relating to 
mind structure), reproduction biases (relating to the mind-to-
world transition), and material biases (relating to world 
structure). Within each functionally-defined class of bias (1-4), 
different specific biases may affect the transmission of a 
practice in qualitatively different ways. As sketched above, 
some of these biases will have to do with facts about social 
networks, some with individual personality traits, some with 
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properties of human perception, attention and memory, some 
with the shape of the human body, some with the culture-
specific means and ends that come with culturally evolved 
structures of activity, some with the organization of complex 
information in cognition. Let us now briefly consider how 
some of the previously described specific biases fit within the 
framework of these macro-categories of transmission bias. 
 
31.4.1  Exposure biases (relating to the world-to-mind 
transition); anything that affects the likelihood that a person 
will come into contact with, and pay attention to, the practice. 
 
Connectedness. All people are situated in social 
networks, but they are situated in different ways. One type of 
difference between people concerns the number of other people 
we come into contact with. So-called connectors have a large 
number of social ties (Granovetter 1973), and so are more 
likely to be involved in an encounter with an innovation. Those 
who have few social network connections will have a lower 
chance of being exposed to a given practice.  
 
Salience. Once one is in the presence of a behaviour or 
kind of innovation one may or may not pay attention to it. 
Things that stand out are more likely to be attended to. The 
definition of ‘stand out’ is clearly a matter of perception in the 
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classical sense of affordances, that is, a matter of the 
relationship between a person and the practice. Some things are 
more likely to be noticed because of the nature of our 
perceptual apparatus in relation to the world. Other things are 
more salient to us because we are on the lookout for them, 
often because our language or culture encourages or requires it; 
this is a kind of active salience. More than one property of a 
thing will contribute to its salience. It may be especially 
prominent in a part of our perceptual field, it may be especially 
persistent. 
 
Identity. Who is the person carrying out the practice 
when it is encountered? If it is somebody who I want to ‘be 
like’ in some way, then I am more likely to pay attention to 
what the person is doing and how. If it is someone I have no 
affinity with, or desire to imitate, I will be less likely to inspect 
their behaviour. In this way, social identity can play a role in 
exposure biases, by affecting the extent to which someone will 
attend, or carefully attend, to the practice when encountered. 
 
31.4.2  Representation biases (relating to mind structure); 
anything that affects the likelihood that, or the manner in 
which, a practice will be learnt or stored by a person, or how 
the psychological or otherwise private component of a practice 
will be structured.  
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Once we have come into contact and at least noticed a 
practice, we can learn it. We form a representation of it, 
attributing to it some meaning or function, and we incorporate 
that representation in a framework of existing representations 
or knowledge. Some innovations are more memorable than 
others. Of two things we may notice, one will be more easily 
internalized. The reasons for this difference concern cognitive 
propensities that are either known from psychological science 
or that are on that research agenda. There are other differences 
in how things are learnt. The modality of an input (seen, heard, 
felt, or some combination of these) can have consequences for 
how a thing is interpreted, learnt and understood (Enfield 
2005). This then affects in turn how the knowledge is used in 
practice (e.g., it may account for how an agent decides that a 
practice is an appropriate means for certain ends in a particular 
context).  
 
There are effects of the psychological context into 
which a practice is embedded. Practices are partly constituted 
by knowledge; knowledge that is caused by, and in turn causes, 
public behaviour and associated states of affairs. Like any 
structured domain, knowledge is characterized by structured 
patterns that include part-whole relations, hierarchical relations, 
and other sorts of dependency among items in a system. When 
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we learn something we relate it to other things we know, at the 
very least because it was related to other things in the context 
in which we learnt it. As an example, if I learn a new word 
such as unfriend, I relate it to other words I already know, both 
in terms of similarity (untie, undo, unfold) and association (e.g., 
the fact the unfriend is a verb and can be used only with 
specific grammatical roles in English sentences). Or if I learn 
about the possibility of downloadable ringtones I will naturally 
contextualize this in terms of my existing knowledge of mobile 
phones and Internet access. Through this context bias I am 
more readily able to learn and psychologically represent those 
things that have an existing ‘place’.  
 
In language, items are structured into conceptual 
frames, systems of categorization, semplates, conceptual 
metaphors, structural paradigms and syntagms. There is good 
reason to think that these systems will tend toward symmetry, 
consistency, and simplicity, though of course this does not 
mean that they will be symmetrical, consistent, and simple. 
Change is always taking place, and because of the nature of 
systems, when something happens in one place it will have 
effects in another place. In the densely structured linguistic 
systems of lexicon and grammar, such system-internal 
relational perturbations sometimes give rise to a degree of 
‘psychological shakiness’, as Sapir (1921) put it, which can 
18	  	  
lead to significant reorganization of a system, in the private, 
mental realm, and then potentially in the public realm. 
 
In the broadest sense of meaning, capturing everything 
from the arbitrary meanings of words in languages to the 
affordance-grounded functions of tools (Kockelman 2006), we 
are helped by what can be called natural meaning. If a word or 
grammatical expression is compatible with other information, 
for example by having iconic properties, it is better learnt and 
remembered. Similarly for technology, if there is a good match 
between functions and affordances, then we are more likely to 
understand the practice, it will be easier to learn, and indeed 
what needs to be stored representationally is reduced because 
the relevant information can stored materially (Norman 1991). 
This kind of content bias pertains to learning, storage, and 
reduction of load on cognition, thus illustrating some ways in 
which ‘representation’ is a functional rubric for transmission 
biases. 
 
31.4.3  Reproduction biases (relating to the mind-to-world 
transition); anything that affects the likelihood that a person 
will employ the practice themselves. 
 
One way to think of this sense of reproduction is 
whatever causes a person to turn the private representation of a 
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practice into action whose production and effects are then 
perceptible by others. 
 
What motivates us to turn knowledge into action? On a 
commonsense view, daily life consists of courses of goal-
directed behaviour that are motivated by our beliefs and desires 
(see e.g., Davidson 2006; Searle 1983; Fodor 1987). When we 
act, we have reasons. Typically these reasons are grounded in 
our beliefs and oriented toward our goals. Thus, a typical 
reason for reproducing a practice is as a means to an end. I may 
want to get something done for which I need someone else’s 
cooperation. One way to do this is to produce an utterance 
using words and grammatical constructions. So I am motivated 
to choose words. Depending on my specific goals, I will select 
certain words and will thereby select against all the other words 
I could have chosen. This is the competition among words and 
grammatical forms referred to in Darwin’s (1859)(1871:60) 
quote of Max Müller (1870): ‘A struggle for life is constantly 
going on amongst the words and grammatical forms in each 
language’. The competition among different cultural practices 
operates in the same way. I have a goal, I have certain beliefs 
about how it can be attained, I have certain knowledge that 
allows me to set courses of action in motion where certain 
effects are foreseen. All this points to a powerful bias under the 
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reproduction rubric, concerning functional needs, and means to 
ends.  
 
Boyd and Richerson’s content bias fits partly under this 
rubric. As discussed above, a content bias favours a practice 
that is more beneficial in some way to the one selecting it. As 
Boyd and Richerson point out, some aspects of these biases are 
‘direct’, others are ‘indirect’. A direct bias is in operation when 
the benefit concerns the greater functional payoff, or reduced 
cost, of the practice, in terms of the primary effects it brings 
about. In the table tennis example, a direct bias would favour 
the pencil grip if the pencil grip were lower in cost or greater in 
benefit than the handle grip, that is, in terms of its efficacy for 
getting the ball back over the net and, ultimately, winning 
matches. An indirect bias is in operation when the perceived 
cost or benefit involved concerns not the direct effects of the 
practice on things in the world (e.g., efficacy in getting the ball 
back over the net) but concerns how, by virtue of you having 
made that choice, other people will regard you because of who 
else makes that same choice. The indirect bias is about the 
effects of whom you identify with (or against) by virtue of 
choosing a practice.  
 
In language, there is an extensive literature on this 
phenomenon in the field of sociolinguistics. Speaking English, 
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I might say guy in one context and bloke in another. It may be 
that there is a slight meaning difference between these two 
words (thus invoking a direct content bias), but these 
differences may be minimal compared to the effect of 
identifying myself with certain sub-cultural groups by virtue of 
this choice between different word forms with near-identical 
meanings. Clearer examples concern pronunciation: whether I 
choose to say working or workin’ has more to do with who I 
identify with (an indirect bias) rather than what meaning I 
convey (a direct bias). In the cultural realm, both a Rolex and a 
Tagheuer will tell the time for a high price but the choice may 
depend on whether you want to identify with Roger Federer 
versus Tiger Woods (or, indeed, tennis versus golf). And there 
is perhaps most often some combination of the two. Do I 
choose to drink this brand of beer over all the rest because it 
tastes better (a irect bias) or because by doing so I identify with 
some person or group of people (an indirect bias)? It could be 
both. In any case, the mechanisms at play will serve to bias a 
person’s motivation for selecting one practice over all the 
others that he thereby does not select.  
 
The indirect bias is also sometimes described as a model 
bias. There is an important distinction to be made here 
depending on the age of the person concerned. Infants and 
children, who cannot yet be considered full members of a 
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culture, are engaged in an intensive project of socialization. 
The process involves constant and large-scale adoption of 
cultural practices, in which the child attends to certain practices 
(often because their attention is drawn to them by adults and 
peers, other times because they are naturally motivated), and 
reproduces them in their own behaviour as means to ends. How 
does a child select which variants of a practice to adopt? A 
conformity bias favours those practices that ‘everyone else’ 
adopts  (Boyd and Richerson 1985; Gergely and Csibra 2006). 
Another term for this bias is docility (Simon 1990), that is, an 
adaptive propensity to adopt more or less unquestioningly the 
practices of your group. For the infant this group will tend also 
to consist of the people to whom one is genetically most closely 
related. The effect is that cultural practices tend to (but need 
not) have similar histories as genes.  
 
As a person becomes socialized to the point that they 
are regarded a full member of a cultural group, they will 
encounter a greater range and number of cultural items (i.e., 
they continue learning), and they may find themselves therefore 
with new choices. This may be because they encounter other 
ways of doing things than the way ‘my people’ do things, 
through their contacts with other groups, for instance in trading, 
ritual and other kinds of inter-group social interaction. 
Different people will have different degrees of mobility, 
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sometimes differing because of personality, sometimes 
differing more predictably depending on things like gender 
(men often travel more widely than women), age or sub-
culture. At a later age, there is a greater degree of choice and 
therefore greater competition between choices. We may or may 
not consciously deliberate about such choices. But as adults we 
may be more aware of the meanings of the different options. 
Here’s where the indirect bias looks more like the model bias 
exploited in advertising and also active in any other diffusional 
process as a low-level favouring of those practices that are 
modelled by more admired or charismatic people. 
 
31.4.4  Material biases (relating to world structure); anything 
that affects the manner in which a practice will be physically 
instantiated in the perceptible world.  
 
Material biases concern the affordances of a cultural 
item for exposure and reproduction. Material biases can affect 
exposure biases in some obvious ways. Speech, for instance, as 
a result of a particular reproduction process (vocalization), has 
the property of being instantiated in fleeting form. A fact about 
the material of speech is that it is perceptible at the time of 
production but then it is gone. But when a reproduction process 
involving language is carried out through writing, this 
evanescence is dramatically lessened, and the dynamics of 
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transmission are significantly affected. Outside of language, we 
see similar contrasts. Forms of activity such as adopting a 
certain grip for table tennis are temporally fleeting and are only 
available for exposure simultaneously with the reproduction 
process that potentially constitutes the transmission event 
(photos, etc., aside). The table tennis bat itself, however, has a 
more persistent physical existence. Material biases concern the 
specific nature of the ‘publication’ of cultural practices such 
that they may continue to play a role in the exposure-





The purpose of this chapter has been to address the need for an 
explanatory framework in the study of transmission biases in 
cultural epidemiology, focussing on the case of language. A 
proper account of the cultural evolution of language must be 
explicit about the causal anatomy of the process. Previous work 
has usefully identified and described transmission biases, but 
one might ask: Why these biases? What others might we 
predict are possible? How many might there be? I submit that 
we can answer these questions with reference to the basic 
causal anatomy of social transmission in human populations. 
Cultural epidemiology is powered by a four-stroke engine, a 
25	  	  
causal chain from exposure to representation to replication to 
material instantiation, back to exposure and round again. When 
we talk about transmission biases, we mean any force that is 
responsible for causing this engine to accelerate, or to falter and 
stall, by virtue of its effects on any of the links in this 
potentially open-ended chain of iterated practice.  
 
Subsequent research should now turn to the tasks of, 
firstly, seeing if we can account for all of the currently known 
and understood biases within this ‘four-stroke engine’ 
framework, and secondly, articulating predictions made by the 
framework such that we may empirically test them. In addition, 
such research should ultimately connect to research on the 
initial evolution in our species of the capacity for cumulative 
culture, a capacity that is so strongly pronounced in humans 
and so weak if present at all in our closest relatives the other 
apes. A first place to look for clues here would be to consider 
the known biases in connection with what is known about the 
cognition and social structure of other species. While we can 
readily assume that other animals are engaged in goal-directed 
courses of action, and that they select from among different 
means for certain ends in both the social and material realms, 
their selection of means for ends is relatively less flexible than 
that of humans. We might assume that a chimpanzee, say, will 
be guided in its selection of a behavioural strategy by a strong 
26	  	  
content bias, incorporating a basic min-max payoff logic. But if 
their repertoire of strategies is, on the whole, not being learnt 
from others, then the transmission biases will have little 
traction. That said, a topic for research could be to look and see 
the extent to which other apes possess the cognitive 
prerequisites. While the biggest differences between us and 
them are known to be in social cognition, they are nevertheless 
intensely social species with textured social worlds. Many of 
the key cognitive and sociometric ingredients for biased 
transmission may have been in place before the evolution of 
our species, allowing the processes to kick in as soon as culture 
was being transmitted at all.  
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Fig. 31.1. Simplified illustration of iterated practice, or a social 
cognitive causal chain (Sperber 2006:438). 
 
Fig. 31.2. Elements of transmission; a ‘four-stroke engine’ 
model. 
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